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purpose of the policy which might otherwise restrict selfdealing transactions can no longer be accomplished and the
policy is no longer a controlling consideration. There is here
the added safeguard of a statutory standard by which the
services performed for the estate may be objectively evaluated.
[4] It is well settled that the paramount rule in the construction of a will is that the will must be interpreted according to the intention of the testator (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal.
63, 66-67 [193 P. 581]; Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 69 [106
P. 230, 137 Am.St.Rep. 110]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337,
344 [55 P. 1011]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423
[229 P. 898]; 26 Cal.Jnr. 897), and that intention must be
given effect as far as possible. (Pro b. Code, § 101.) In the
present case there can be no dispute as to the intention of
the testatrix and hence the only problem is the fulfillment
of that intention. Her direction in disposing of her estate
should be given effect as she has provided.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

[L.A. No. 24861.
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July 17, 1958.]

CLAUDE ALARID, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER J.
VANIER, Respondent.
[1] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption.The presumption of negligence which arises from the violation
of a statute is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence
of justification or excuse.
(2] Automobiles-Violation of Regulations.-In an action for personal injuries and property damage suffered when plaintiff's
car, which had stopped behind five other cars at an inter
section, was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by de[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 25; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 158
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, §§ 188, 213; Am.Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 231 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Negligence,§ 91; [2] Automobiles,
§155(1); [4] Appeal and Error, §1095; [5] Automobiles, §273a;
[6] Automobiles, J 355(5); [7] Negligence,§ 181; [8] Automobiles,
§§ 386(1), 386(2); [9] Appeal and Error, § 48.1.
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there was no evidence of contributory neglifrom defendant's admission that a
of his brakes was a
cause of the accident,
defendant would be liable as a matter of law in the absence of
sui'ficient excuse or justification for violation of Veh. Code,
§§
as they read at the time of the accident.
[3] Negligence-Violation of Statute-Rebuttal of Presumption.The correct test to be applied in determining whether a person
a statute has overcome the presumption of negligence is
he has sustained the burden of showing that
he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence acting under similar circumstances who desired
to comply >vith the law, rather than that justification or excuse
can be found only in causes or things "beyond the control of
the person charged with the violation" (disapproving inconsistent language in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d
531]; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581,
589 [177 P.2d 279]; Gruss v. Coast Transpo1·t, Inc., 154 Cal.
App.2d 85, 87-90 [315 P.2d 339]; Miller v. Jensen, 137 Cal.App.
2d 251, 256-257 [290 P.2d 52]; Ga1·cia v. Webb, 131 Cal.App.2d
448, 450-451
P.2d 829]; Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,
129 CaLApp.2d 67, 77-79 [276 P.2d 703]; Kuehn v. Lowthian,
124 Cal.App.2d 867, 871-872 [269 P.2d 666]; Gmf v. Garcia,
117 Cal.App.2d 792, 797-798 [256 P.2d 995]; Carlson v. Shewalter, 110 Cul.App.2d 655, 658 [243 P.2d 549]; Parmalee v.
Bartolomei, 106 Cal.App.2d 68, 70-72 [234 P.2d 1019]; Wilkerson v. Brown, 84 Cai.App.2d 401, 466-407 [190 P.2d 958];
JJfecchi v. Lyon Van cf" Storage Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 674, 682-688
[102 P.2d 422]; Gallichotte v. Calif. Mut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App.
2d 503, 506 [ 41 P.2d 349]; M01·ris v. Purity Sausage Co., 2 Cal.
App.2d 536, 539-540 [38 P.2d 193] ), or that the jury may
assume that a person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey the law and will do so unless causes, not of his
own intended making, induce him, without moral fault, to do
otherwise (disapproving inconsistent language in Combs v. Los
Angeles Ry. Co1·p., 29 Cal.2d 606, 609-611 [177 P.2d 293];
McEachen v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546, 551 [310 P.2d
122] ).
[ 4] Appeal-Right to Allege Error-Invited Error-Instructions.
-Plaintiff in an automobile collision case was in no position
to complain of an erroneous instruction that, in order to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evidence must show
that the statutory violation resulted from causes or things
beyond the control of the person charged with the violation,
where he requested it and it was more favorable to him than a
statement of the proper rule.
[5] Automobiles-Province of Court and Jury-Directed Verdict.
-In an action for personal injuries and property damage suf-
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fered when plaintiff's car, which had
behind five other
cars at an intersection, was struck in the rear by an automobile
driven by defendant, evidence that defendant drove the automobile to test the brakes when he purchased it, that they were
then in good condition, that during the five months elapsing
prior to the accident there was nothing
with the brakes
and that they were "working in
months after the
he
at a
service station
was given a service
and guarantee," that a few weeks before the accident a garage did some
work on the clutch and no suggestion was then made that there
was anything wrong with the brakes, and that on the day of the
accident he drove 10 miles to his place of employment, stopping at numerous intersections, and the brakes worked perfectly, presented a question to the jury as to whether defendant
took sufficient steps to meet his obligation to maintain his
brakes in good condition, and plaintiff's motion for a directed
verdict was properly denied.
[6] !d.-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In an action for personal injuries and property damage suffered when plaintiff's
car, which had stopped behind five other cars at an intersection, was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by defendant, it was error to give an instruction that "the mere
fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support an inference that some party, or nny party, to this action
was negligent," where the uncontradicted evidence warranted
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
[7] Negligence-Instructions-Inference of Negligence-Violation
of Statute.-The giving of an instruction that the mere fact
that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support
an inference that some party, or any party, to the action was
negligent, constitutes error where a presumption of negligence
arises as a result of defendant's disobedience of a statute.
[8] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an
action for personal injuries and property damage suffered
when plaintiff's car, which had stopped behind five other cars
at an intersection, was struck in the rear by an automobile
driven by defendant, errors in giving instructions requested
by defendant on unavoidable accident and that "the mere fact
that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support
an inference that some party, or any party, to this action was
negligent" did not result in a miscarriage of justice requiring
reversal of a judgment for defendant, where there were instructions that under the admitted facts a prima facie case had
been proved against defendant and that, in order to escape
liability, he must exculpate himself by showing justification or
excuse, and where the evidence on this issue was uncontra-
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dieted and sufficient to show that prior to the accident defendant took reasonable precautions to see that his brakes were in
working condition.
[9] Appeal-Decisions Appealable--Verdict.-No appeal lies from
a verdict.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
Robert Gardner, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from verdict dismissed.
Action for damages for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of an automobile accident. Judgment for
defendant affirmed.
Simon & McKinsey and Thomas W. McKinsey for Appellant.
Powell & Banyard, Robert A. Banyard and Robert B. Powell
for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff brought this action to recover for
personal injuries and property damage suffered when his
car was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by defendant. He appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant,
contending that the judgment is contrary to the evidence
and that he was prejudiced by certain instructions given
at defendant's request.
The manner in which the accident occurred is undiRputed.
Plaintiff was driving south in the outside lane of a level, fourlane asphalt highway. It was a clear day, and the pavement
was dry. He brought his car to a stop approximately 100 feet
north of an intersection which had stop signs at all four
corners. Five cars had stopped between plaintiff and the
intersection, and, after he had been there for 15 or 20 seconds,
waiting for the traffic to proceed, he heard a squeal of brakes
and the rear of his car was struck by the front of defendant's
car.
Defendant testified that he had driven onto the highway
two and a half blocks north of the scene of the accident, and,
as he proceeded toward the intersection, he observed plaintiff's car coming to a stop. When traveling at 20 miles per
hour and about 200 feet from the place where plaintiff had
stopped, defendant applied his brakes, hut they did not take
hold. There was no resistance to the pressure which he ap-
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plied, and the peual went all the way to the floor. Defendant
could not turn to the left because another automobile was
there, and he was afraid to turn to the right, toward a ditch,
for fear he might tip oYer. In the stress of the moment he
decided to g·o straight ahead, and he was so excited he did
not think of using the hand brake. vVituesses who examined
defendant's ear after the accident testified that the br·ake
pedal, when tested, went down to the floor without resistance
and that there were ''no brakes.''
The parties agree that, under the undisputed evidence,
a presumption of negligence upon the part of defendant
arose by reason of the operation of sections 670 and 679 of
the Vehicle Code as they read at the time of the accident.
Section 670 then provided: '' (a) No person shall operate on
any highway any motor vehicle . . . unless such motor vehicle . . . is equipped with brakes adequate to bring such
motor vehicle . . . to a complete stop when operated upon
dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface where the grade
does not exceed 1 per cent at the speeds set forth in the
following table within the distances set opposite such speeds:
[The stopping distance for a speed of 20 miles per hour was
fixed at 37 feet.*] . . . (c) If a vehicle is equipped with
more than one system of brakes, each shall be maintained in
good working order. . . . " Section 679 declared that it was
unlawful to operate on any highway any vehicle which was
in an unsafe condition or was not equipped as required by the
code.
[1] The presumption of negligence which arises from the
violation of a statute is rebuttable and may be overcome by
evidence of justification or excuse. (Gallup v. Sparks-],! undo
Engineering Co., 43 Ca1.2d 1, 9 [271 P.2d 34] ; Tossman v.
Newman, 37 Cal.2d 522, 525 [233 P.2d 1].) [2] There is
no evidence of contributory neglig·ence, and, since it is clear
from defendant's admission that the failure of his brakes was
a proximate cause of the accident, it follows that defendant
would be liable as a matter of law in the absence of a sufficient excuse or justification for violation of the code. It is
plaintiff's contention that defendant did not produce enough
evidence to rebut the presumption and, therefore, that the
*The provisions relating to stopping distances now appear in section
670.05 of the Vehicle Code, which specifies a maximum stopping distance
of 25 feet for a car like defendant's when traveling at a speed of 20
miles per hour.
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trial court erred in
's motion for a direeted
verdict upon the issue of liability. In
upon this contention we must consider what rule is to be applied in determining whether defendant has overcome the presumption.
A
number of cases, although varying -;onsiderably in
the
stand
for the proposition that
where a person has
a statute he may excuse or
the violation
evidence that he did what might reabe
of a person of ordinary prudence acting
undm· similar circumstances who desired to comply with the
standard of conduct establishrd
the statute. (See Nevis
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 626, 633
P.2d 761]
l" nonnegligent" ignorance of facts] ; Gray v. B1·inkerhofj, 41
Cal.2d 180, 184 [258 P.2d 834] [declaring that the violator
could have fulfilled his duty ''if he had exercised ordinary
care"] ; .Wh1'techat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 436-438 [122
P.2d 47]; Berkovitz v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal.
195, 198-200 [215 P. 675] [unlighted tail light]; Edgett v.
Fairchild, 153 Ca1.App.2d 734, 738-739 [314 P.2d 973] ; McEachcn v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [310 P.2d
122] ; Bryant v. 'Tulare Ice Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 566, 569 [270
P.2d 880]; Taylor v . •Jackson, 123 Cal.App.2d 199, 201-202
[266 P.2d 605] ; Fuentes v. Panella, 120 Cal.App.2d 175, 183184 [260 P.2d 853]; Driver v. Norman, 106 Cal.App.2d 725,
727-728 [236 P.2d 6]; Merry v. Knudsen Creamery Co., 94
Cal.App.2d 715, 719 et seq. [211 P.2d 905] [brake failure];
Dennis v. Gonzales, 91 Cal.App.2d 203, 206, 209-210 [205 P.2d
55] ; Mats1tmoto v. Renner, 90 Cal.App.2d 406, 411 f202 P.2d
1051] [unlighted tail light]; Takahashi v. White Tntek etc.
Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 107, 110 [59 P.2d 161] [unlighted tail
light] ; Nelson v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 10 Cal.App.2d 448,
449-450 [51 P.2d 885] [unlighted taillight]; Hardin v. Sutherland, 106 Cal.App. 473, 479-480 [289 P. 900] ; Rath v.
Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274, 279-284 [281 P. 1081] [dictum re
brake failure] ; Phillips v. Pickwick Stages, 85 Cal.App. 571,
573-574 [259 P. 968] [dictum re brake failnrc]; Giorgetti v.
Wollaston, 83 Cal.App. 358, 363 [257 P. 109] [unlighted tail
light]; cf. M & M etc. Transport Co. v. California Auto Transp01·t Co., 43 Cal.2d 847 [279 P.2d 13] .)
In a second group of cases it is stated or indicated that
justification or excuse for violation of a statute can be found
only in causes or things "beyond the control of the person
charged with the violation." (See Onwles v. W iggcr, 35 Cal.
2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d 531]; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School
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Dist., 29 Cal.2d

-----------------

589 [177 P.2d 279]; Gruss Coast Transport, Inc., 154 Cal.App.2d
87-90
P.2d
Miller
v. Jensen, 137 Cal.App.2d 251, 256-2G7 [290 P.2c1
v. Webb, 131 Cal.App.2d 448, 450-451
P.2d
v. So7dhern Pacific Co., 129 Cal.App.2c1 67, 77-79
P.2d
703]; Kuehn v.
124 CaL'\pp.2d 867, 871-872 [269
P.2d 666]; Graf v.
117 Cal.App.2d
797-798 [256
P.2d 995] Carlson v. Shc1Daltcr, 110
658
[243 P.2d 549]; Parmalee v. Bartolomei, 106 Cal.App.2d 68,
70-72 [234 P.2d 1019] ; Wilkerson v.
84 Cal.App.2d
401, 406-407 [190 P.2d 958]; Jtlccchi v. Lyon Van & Storage
Co., 38 Cal.App.2d 674, 682-683 [102 P.2d 422]; Gallichotte v.
California JJiut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 506 [ 41 P.2d
349]; Mor1·is v. Purity Sa1tsage Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 536, 539-540
[38 P.2d 193].) Instructions to this effect are contained in
California Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 149 and No. 149.1, but
the authors state that these were included in deference to a
dictum in Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474, 479 [218 P.2d
531], and that such an instruction sets up a confusing and
impossible standard. (See 1 CaL Jury Instns., Civ. (4th rev.
ed., 1956), pp. 392-393.) Many of the cases in this group have
not applied the "beyond the control" test strictly but, rather,
have used it in the sense that the factors or causes involved
would not have been anticipated and guarded against by a
person of ordinary prudence who wished to obey the statute.
·A third method of expressing what would serve as a justification or excuse is found in an instruction, approved by
some cases, which declares that the jury may assume that a
person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey
the law and will do so unless causes, not of his own intended
making, induce him, without moral fault, to do otherwise.
(Combs v. Los Angdes Ry. Corp., 29 Cal.2d 606, 609-611 [177
P.2d 293] ; see JJ1cEachen v. Richmond, 150 Cal.App.2d 546,
551 [310 P.2d 122]; see also Cal. Jury Instns., Civ. (4th rev.
ed., 1956), pp. 392-393.) However, it has been held not
error to refuse to give this instruetion because it contains
vag·ue and shadowy concepts which laelc the precision of good
legal definition. ( Cucnk v. Payne, 140 CaLApp.2d 881, 887
[296 P .2d 7].) The criticism seems to be valid, sinee it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for jurors to understand from
this language what they were expected to look for in passing
upon the conduct of the person who is charged with having
violated the statute.
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[3] In our opinion the correct test is whether the person
vvho has violated a statute has sustained the burden of showing
that he did what might reasonably be expected of a person
of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who
desired to comply with the law. The language contained in
the second and third groups of eases referred to above is disapproved insofar as it is inconsistent with the rule just stated.
[4] The jury in the present case was instructed that, in
order to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evidence must show that the statutory violation resulted from
causes or things beyond the control of the person charged with
the violation. Plaintiff, howeYer, is not in a position to complain of this instruction since he requested it and it was more
favorable to him than a statement of the proper rule.
[5] When the correct test is applied to the facts of the
present ease, it appears that the evidence is sufficient to go
to a jury on the question whether defendant acted as an ordinary prudent man who wished to comply with the statutory
requirements as to brakes. Defendant's automobile was a
1949 model which he had purchased in January 1955, and
it was equipped with hydraulic foot brakes and a mechanical
hand brake which worked independently. There is evidence
that he drove the car to test the brakes when he purchased it
and that they were in good condition. During the five months
which elapsed prior to the accident, there was nothing wrong
with the brakes and they were "working in perfect condition." Defendant had the car lubricated at a service station
in April 1955 and was given a service ''receipt and guarantee'' which indicated that the wheel brake cables and master
cylinder had been inspected and lubricated and that no service
or replacements were recommended. A few vveeks before the
accident a garage did some work on the clutch, and at that
time no suggestion was made to defendant that there was
anything wrong with the brakes. On the day of the accident
defendant drove 10 miles to his place of employment, stopping
at numerous intersections, and the brakes worked perfectly.
The car was parked at 7 :45 in the morning and was not
driven until defendant's quitting time at 4 :30 p.m. After he
left his parking place, it was not neecssary for him to apply
the brakes until he reached the scene of the accident, about
two and a half bloeks away, and he had no warning of any
kind that there was anything wrong with the brakes.
The evidence thus presents a question for the jury as to
whether defendant took sufficient steps to meet his obligation
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to maintain his brakes in good condition, and plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied.
[6] Plaintiff is correct in his contention that errors were
committed in giving instructions requested by defendant. The
court gave the unavoidable accident instruction condemned
in Butigan v. Yellow Cab.
49 Cal.2d 652
P.2d 500].
'l'he
was also instructed: ''The mere fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support an inference that some party, or any party, to this action was negligent." \Ve have held
where, as here, the uncontradicted
evidence warrants the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, it is error to give the quoted instruction. (Jensen v.
1Jiinard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [282 P.2d 7] ; see Shaw v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, ante, pp. 153, 156-158 [323 P.2d 391];
Phillips v. Noble, ante, pp. 163, 166-167 [323 P.2d 385];
Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166, 170 et seq. [308 P.2d
724] ; cf. Brown v. George
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d
256, 261-262 [143 P.2d 929]; England v. Hospital of Good
Samaritan, 22 Cal..App.2d 226, 230 [70 P.2d 692] ; Ellis v.
Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634 [64 P.2d 432] .) [7] For the
reasons set forth in the cited cases holding it is error to give
the mere happening of the accident instruction where an inference of negligence arises as a matter of law, it is likewise
error to give that instruction where a presumption of negligence arises as a result of defendant's disobedience of a statute. The question is whether these errors require a reversal
of the judgment. ( Const., art. VI, § 4Yz.)
[8] No precise forrnula can be drawn for deciding whether
there has been a miscarriage of justice. In each instance the
determination whether the probable effect of an instruction
has been to mislead the jury and whether the error has been
prejudicial so as to require a reversal depends upon all the
circumstances, including the evidence and the other instructions given. Here there were instructions that made it clear
that under the admitted facts a prima facie case has been
proved against defendant and that, in order to escape liability,
he must exculpate himself by showing justification or excuse .
.As we have seen, the evidence on this issue was uncontradicted
and amply sufficient to show that prior to the accident defendant took reasonable precautions to see that his brakes
were in good working condition. Under the circumstances it
does not appear that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
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[9] The appeal from the "verdict" is dismissed smee no
appeal lies therefrom. The
is affirmed.
'l'raynor, J., S::hauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McComb, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
It is my considered opinion that the giving of the two improper instructions caused a miscarriage of justice and that
the judgment should be reversed.
The ephemeral constitutional standard for identifying reversible error has not been rendered concrete by judicial effort.
Certainly the people of California did not intend to nullify
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 7, of
the California Constitution by adding article VI, section 4lf2,
which requires a miscarriage of justice to justify a reversal.*
A proper construction would be consonant with the purpose of
the amendment which is to relieve the judiciary of the burden
of retrying eases merely because of technical errors. It does
not license appellate courts to weigh evidence except where
it is so massive on one side as to remove the issue from any
doubt. The statement of this court in Herbert v. Lankershim,
9 Cal.2d 409 at 476 [71 P.2d 220], is pertinent: That article
VI, section 41/2 may dispel error only if the justice of the
case preponderates so obviously that none of the errors could
have contributed to the findings below.
To affirm this case because the errors committed were nonprejudicial, this court has been for·eed to make factual determinations from the record and effectively deprive appellant
of his right to a jury trial. The majority has determined that
the inference of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and by statutory violation is rebutted by defendant's
own testimony.
In Phillips v. Noble, ante, p. 163 [323 P.2d 385], the
court instructed the jury that the happening of an accident
does not necessarily mean there was negligence. In dissenting
( p. 92) I suggested the followin<5 tests for determining prejudicial error:
( 1) If there is a conflict in the evidence concerning defendant's negligence and weak or nonexistent evidence of plain*I have discussed this at length in two dissents: Buckley v. Chadwick,
45 Cnl.2d 183 at 208 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242], and People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal.2d 590 at 604 [290 P.2d 505].
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tiff's contributory negligence, the giving of this instruction
is prejudiciaL
(2) If the evidence of defendant's negligence is weak and
there is substantial evidence of contributory negligence, the
error is probably nonprejudiciaL
If plaintiff makes out a prima facie case based on res
ipsa loquitur applied as a matter of law, it is always prejudicial error to
the questioned instruction.
This case clearly falls within tests (1) and (3) above stated.
THE EFFECT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS UPON THE JURY

The trial court instructed the jury that if defendant violated the statutory duty to have proper brakes, then he was
presumed negligent. The court previously gave the instruction that the occurrence of an accident does not necessarily
imply negligence and the unavoidable accident instruction.
Although res ipsa loquitur applies to this case as a matter of
law, no instruction on this doctrine was requested.
The inference arising from defendant's conduct forced him
to produce evidence powerful enough to convince the jury
that it was not probable that he was negligent. The effect
of the instructions was to confuse or erase this imprrssion
in the jurors' minds. ( Butiga.n v. Yell ow Cab Co., 49 Ca1.2d
652 [320 P.2d 500] ; J e11sen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325 [282
P.2d 7] .) This alone has been designated prejudieial error.
(Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal.2d 232 [149 P.2d 4] ; Hyman
v. Market Street Ry. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 647 fl07 P.2d 485];
Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Cal.App. 307 [22 P.2d 545].) The
instruction in the instant case is stronger than in Butigan
because it omitted the cautionary statement that the defense
of unavoidable accident may not be used by a defendant who
did not use ordinary care. The addition of the instrnrtion
that a collision between two automobiles dors not neeessarily
imply negligence made the error more damaging than was the
case in Butigan.
These instructions probably confnseil the jurv beeausr:
(1) There could be no evidence of unavoiilable aceident
in this case under the Butigan rule. A conscientious juror,
reasonably expecting only pertinent instructions, would naturally search his memory for facts which might fit this pattern.
The phrase "unavoidable accident" strongly suggests an undefinable arra of activity betwren defenilant 's nonnrglicyence
and his slight nrgligence. In the instant case the evidence
suggests defendant was not grossly negligent. Such negligence
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as the
carpet of unavoidable accident. Where the issue of negligence
is a close one, such an alternative is
The confusion
caused
the
instructions was
here
by the instruction that an accident of this character does not
imply
The inferences
out of facts
to this
collision establish
on the part of defendant unless
he proves otherwise. The
must
its
from
the side of plaintiff, not from a neutral position. These instructions tell the jury a
and may effectively
have eliminated the inferences from the minds of the jurors.
To say they did not is to make a finding of fact by judicial
prescience. To say it is not clear they did is to place on appellant the burden of showing they did. Just how any appellant is to prove the effect of these instruetions upon each
juror's trend of thought is a mystery. But by deciding
arbitrarily that an appellant must do so the court is taking
away the right to trial by jury from appellants with justifiable
complaint. This has been held prejudicial.
(Russell v.
Andersen, 101 Cal.App.2d 684, see 697 [226 P.2d 350] ; Bie8er
v. Davies, 119 Cal.App. 659, sec 664 [7 P.2d 388].)
Because the inferences were obliterated by the instructions
the jury did not have to examine drfendant 's evidence. If
the jury did not think the mere malfunctioning of brakes or
defendant's sole control of the vehicle was sufficient evidence
of his negligence, defendant needed no justification in their
eyes. This court,
has determinrd for them that defendant's testimony vvas true and his actions reasonable even
though the Constitution says the plaintiff may have this determined by a jury of his peers. The majority decision here
is an excellent example of thP misehicf
by this
court by taking upon itself the job of faet finding.
DEFENDANT's TESTIMONY DoEs NoT ExPLAIN THE FAILURE
OF Jirs BRAKES

According to defendant's own testimony:
(1) During the five months he owned the car its brakes
always worked;
(2) He had his clutch repaired at Newton's Garage two to
four weeks before the collision. Defendant testified that the
employees of the garage did not then recommend any repair
of the brakes. There was no testimony that the brakes were
Pvcn tested at that time l
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About two months before the collision defendant had his
car lubricated. The service station gave defendant a service
receipt and guarantee which indicated by check marks that
the wheel brake cables and master cylinder had been inspected
and lubricated in accordance with the company's lubrication
No service or
were recommended at that
time .
.All of this was self-interested
of defendant and it
is open to suspicion for that reason. No inference can be
drawn from number (2) as to the condition of the brakes at
that time. The value of testimony under (3) is open to these
questions:
(a) How thorough was the station's inspection 1
(b) How qualified were the personnel to judge the condition of the whole brake system?
(c) Did defendant inspect the brakes when he bought the
used car 1 Were his later inspections frequent and thorough
enough 1
(d) Assuming the master cylinder and cables were in good
condition, was the whole system tested? What part of it
failed and caused the collision~
The latter is a vital point. The theory of res ipsa loquitur
is that the defendant must show what caused the injury because only he knows. In this case defendant did not present
this evidence. It was incumbent upon him to show his lack
of negligence in respect to the very cattse of the accident if
he was able to do so. (Dierman v. ProV?:ilence Hospital, 31
Ca1.2d 290 [188 P.2d 12].) He made no effort to do so nor to
explain why he didn't. His evidence is to be viewed with
distrust (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 7).
It is the jury's function to determine the truthfulness of
testimony and it may reject evidence it disbelieves. Therefore
the fact that it was uncontradicted does not mean it would
have to be believed. It is also a jury function to determine
whether particular acts constitute negligence by applying the
reasonable man test. The processes of a court are legal, not
mechanical. In this case the majority has usurped all of those
functions and determined facts from the record. Article VI,
seetion 4Jfz, and article I, section 7, do not permit us this
privilege.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
SHENK, J.-I dissent ..
The evidence shows conclusively that the plaintiff was en-
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tirely faultless in what occurred,
his personal injuries
and damage to his property. The defendant ran into his
automobile from the rear and there is not the slightest suggestion of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The defendant was operating his car with defective brakes in violation
of the law. He was thereby presumptively negligent.
The true test of his culpability is not whether he did all
that a reasonable man should to have his mechanical brakes
kept in good condition, but what he did immediately prior to
the accident. By his own admission he neglected to use his
hand brakes. His statement that he was too excited to use
them did not absolve him from negligence. One of the tragedies of the law is that an innocent victim, one entirely without
fault, is subjected to personal injury, and is without redress,
as against the operator of an instrumentality put upon the
highway which may because of its defective condition in the
hands of the operator, cause harm to another who is entirely
without fault. The instructions were admittedly erroneous,
and under the circumstances of this case were prejudicial.
There is authority in the second group of cases cited in the
majority opinion to support a conclusion of liability in this
case as a matter of law. In addition, the judgment could be
reversed on the theory of Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,
205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R. 475]. In my opinion
there has been a miscarriage of justice in this case. The
judgment should be reversed.

